In many globalized industries, the recent wave of vertical outsourcing seems to have co-evolved with increased horizontal consolidation in the component sector. To account for this phe- 
Introduction
An emerging international trade literature has focused on the determinants of international outsourcing by incorporating Grossman and Hart's (1986) and Hart and Moore's (1990) property rights theory of the firm into general-equilibrium trade models. 1 The Grossman-Hart-Moore (GHM) framework states that -in an environment with incomplete contracts and relationship-specific investments -the residual rights of control over assets should be assigned to the party whose investment contributes most to the value of the relationship. If final good firms contribute more, vertical integration should occur; otherwise, outsourcing is preferable. In the trade literature, Grossman and Helpman (2002) have incorporatd elements of the GHM framework into a one-input general equilibrium model with monopolistic competition. By assuming that inputs must be fully tailored to final product specifications and that firms face incomplete contracts in arm's length relationships, they create a traditional hold-up problem under outsourcing. Firms weigh this holdup friction against the less efficient production of inputs under vertical integration. They use this setup to identify sectoral characteristics that lead to one or the other equilibrium structure. Antràs (2003) and Antràs and Helpman (2004) extend the Grossman and Helpman framework to a setting where both the input provider and the final good firm need to provide relationship-specific inputs.
In accordance with GHM, they find that the relative intensity of these inputs turns out to be an important determinant of the choice between vertical integration and outsourcing. In particular, sectors that are relatively intensive in final-good components are predicted integrate, while sectors that are relatively intensive in intermediate-good components should outsource.
While these studies have laid important building blocks to explain the outsourcing phenomenon, the simplifying assumptions in these models that (1) inputs are completely specialized and of no use outside the existing relationship and (2) components can be sold to at most one final good firm, have led to an oversight of other outsourcing strategies that are actively adopted. 2 Recent work on global value chain governance highlights the existence of multiple types of outsourcing relations with input providers depending on the degree of product and process standardization. Sturgeon and Lee (2001) , for example, distinguish three types of input providers to whom lead firms outsource: (1) the "commodity supplier" provides generic products to the downstream firm;
1 See Spencer (2005) for a survey of the international outsourcing literature.) 2 Grossman and Helpman (2002) provide a model extension where assumption (1) is relaxed.
(2) the "captive supplier" makes specialized products using machinery dedicated to the buyer's needs, and (3) the "turn-key supplier" uses flexible machinery to produce customized products for multiple buyers. They document that, in the electronics industry, brand-name electronics firms have primarily outsourced their manufacturing capacity to a handful of globally operating "turnkey" contract manufacturers. 3 This has had important repercussions for the sector's industrial landscape, inducing the trend of vertical disintegration to co-evolve with an increased market concentration in its manufacturing segment. 4 Similar trends have been found in other global industries such as semiconductors (Langlois and Steinmueller, 1999) , telecommunications (Li and Whalley, 2002) , and automobiles (Sturgeon and Florida, 2000) . 5 This co-evolution has far-reaching positive and normative implications. Positively, it provides further insights into the trends in international specialization. It suggests that the vertical outsourcing process does not necessarily lead to smaller firms and increased competition. Indeed, if it coincides with horizontal consolidation in some vertical layers of production, it can actually induce the emergence of large dominant contract manufacturing firms with monopoly power. Normatively, the co-evolution also has important implications on competition policy (Bresnahan, 1999; Economides, 1999) and industrial upgrading strategies of developing countries (Sturgeon and Lester, 2003) . Baldwin and Clark (2000) , Langlois (2002) and Sturgeon (2002) have related the outsourcing of electronics production and the concomitant rise of the turn-key suppliers to the modularization of electronics products. With modular products, distinct breaks in the value chain tend to form at points where information regarding product specifications can be highly formalized and standardized. As a result, "turn-key suppliers" can take advantage of economies of scale and scope by apply the same generic production routines for multiple clients, without requiring personalized interactions with the buyers. As such, Sturgeon (2002) terms the co-evolution as the emergence of a new model of industrial organization, which he terms modular production networks. 3 Estimates by Technology Forecasters, IDC, and Prudential Financial all pegged contract manufacturers' penetration of the total available market for circuit-board and product-level electronics manufacturing in 2000 at roughly 13% (Sturgeon, 2002) . 4 Electronic Trend Publications (2000) estimated that the top five contract manufacturers had captured 38% of the electronics contract manufacturing market by 1999, and expected this share to grow to 65% in 2003 primarily through mergers and acquisitions.
5 To my knowledge, there have been no empirical studies that have systematically documented the rise and extent of manufacturing outsourcing. Nonetheless, semi-structured qualitative interviews conducted by researchers at MIT's Industrial Performance Center indicate that this reorganization has primarily occurred in complex assembly sectors such as electronics and motor vehicles. or produces standardized inputs (Standardized Outsourcing) to multiple final good producers. As such, this paper links the emergence of modular production networks to the de facto standardization of inputs and production processes that has been taking place in high technology industries such as electronics, telecommunications, semi-conductors and automobiles (Schilling and Steensma, 2001 and Sturgeon, 2002 ).
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 defines modularity and links it to the concept of input specificity. Section 3 sets up the model by identifying the three basic cost trade-offs that determine the vertical and horizontal boundaries of the firm in industry equilibrium. In Section 4, the model is solved. Section 5 finally provides concluding remarks.
In the management literature, modularity defines the ease with which components can be separated and recombined without compromising system integrity (Baldwin and Clark, 2000; Garud and Kumaraswamy, 1995; Sanchez and Mahoney, 1996; Schilling, 2000; Ulrich, 1995). 6 When a product is non-modular, components are specifically adjusted (i.e. tightly coupled) to each other to fully elicit the potential performance of the final product. As a result, any substitution of a component by another variety requires compensating changes to be made to the other components to uphold system integrity. Modular products, on the other hand, consist of loosely coupled components that interact with each other according to well-defined and codified architectural standards. As long as components are compatible to the architectural standards, they thus can be mixed and matched without having to make compensating changes to the other components. Modularizing a product thus can lead to important strategic advantages when it enables a firm to correspond more readily to customer heterogeneity by creating product variations through the mixing and matching of new or existing modular components. This paper argues that the notion of product modularity can be related to the economics literature's concept of input specificity. 7 In a recent paper, Grossman and Helpman (2002) introduced input specificity in their model by associating each final product with an ideal input. If the ideal input is adopted, then the final good firm can use the input for final good production without a need for spending additional customization costs. However, if a more standardized (i.e. non-ideal) input is adopted, then additional resources need to be spent to customize the input to the final good requirements. The concept of modularity can be linked to input specificity by allowing the amount of customization costs to vary across products. If a product is non-modular, many additional resources need to be spent to customize standardized inputs to the final good requirements.
If a product is modular, few resources need to be spent to customize standardized inputs. We will use this link with input specificity to introduce product modularity in the model below. 6 PCs and cell phones are good examples of modular products. They are essentially a limited number of standard parts or modules (e.g., resistors, capacitors, and memory chips), which get mounted onto printed circuit boards in different combinations. In assembling these products, contract manufacturing firms can customize products for heterogeneous end users at a relatively low cost.
7 Input specificity is a type of asset specificity.
Consider an industry that produces differentiated consumer goods. For each variety, the production structure consists of two vertical layers of production, an intermediate good layer z and a final good layer x. To produce intermediate goods z, a unit of labor is required at wage w. I normalize wage w to 1. To produce a final good, one unit of intermediate good is required.
In the intermediate goods sector z, identical firms face increasing returns to scale and produce differentiated inputs in a contestable market setting. In the final goods sector x, identical firms produce differentiated final goods and compete in a Dixit-Stiglitz monopolistic competition market. , with n being the number of final good firms. In figure 1 , this would correspond to one of the following two situations: 11 Take figure 1 as an example. Suppose the intermediate good circle becomes smaller due to an increase in γ. In that case, the customization cost of using z3 in the production of x1 and x2 reduces. As is demonstrated in Figure 2 , the three cost-tradeoffs described above allow the distinction of four production structure regimes. In Figure 2 equilibrium production structure is determined by a two-step procedure. In step one, intermediate and final good firms choose from the four production structures to produce consumer goods. In step two, the firms select the profit maximizing price and quantity given the production regime chosen. The problem is solved through backward induction. 13 
The Model
Global consumers spend a constant fraction β of their income E on output from the industry. They view the varieties by the industry as symmetrically differentiated and perceive a constant elasticity of substitution σ between every pair of goods. Each consumer maximizes a subutility function of 12 The U.S. Office of Technology Assessment defines flexible manufacturing systems as: A production unit capable of producing a range of discrete products with a minimum of manual intervention. 13 The full game tree of this model is described in Van Assche (2003).
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where x(i) is consumption of product i and n is the measure of the number of final products available on the market. These preferences yield the following demand functions for each variety i:
where
Vertical Integration
In stage 2, firms maximize their profits given the production structure chosen in stage 1. I start off by assuming that all identical firms are vertically integrated (V I). In that case, each final good producer chooses to produce the intermediate good z himself. He naturally chooses to produce the ideal component because he is only allowed to sell components to himself and does not want to bear self-imposed customization costs. The final goods producer thus faces the following profit function:
where the marginal cost of production is normalized wages w induced during intermediate good production. The fixed cost of V I production includes the fixed cost of setting up a final good firm By plugging the pricing equation (5) and the demand function (2) into the profit function (4), the expected profit function of a vertically integrated firm is:
Since all firms are identical, (3) reduces to A = βE npx . Imposing the zero profit condition on (6), and combining it with (3) and (5) allows the determination of the equilibrium number of firms:
This leads to the standard Dixit-Stiglitz result that the number of firms is increasing in industry demand βE, and decreasing in the elasticity of substitution σ and the fixed cost of vertical integration F + G x .
Outsourcing
Under outsourcing, a final good firm relies on an external intermediate good firm to produce its inputs. In that case, profits need to be maximized for both 
where k represents the three types of outsourcing, p z is the price of the purchased intermediate 
By plugging the pricing equation (9) and the demand function (2) into the profit function (8), the expected profit of the final good firm is:
The Dixit-Stiglitz zero-profit condition together with (3) and (9) allows the determination of the equilibrium number of final good firms under the three types of outsourcing:
The determination of the equilibrium number of firms in (11) allows me to establish the equilibrium customization cost under Standardized or Customized Outsourcing:
Equation (12) indicates that the customization costδ is positively related to the degree of final good competition σ and to the final good firms' fixed set up cost F . It is negatively related to the degree of product modularity 1 γ , and industry demand βE. Finally, combining (2) and (9) allows the determination of each firm's final good output under outsourcing:
As in Eaton and Schmitt (1994), I assume that intermediate good firms use a flexible manufacturing technology in production which exhibit both economies of scale and economies of scope.
They face a fixed cost G z for setting up their firm and developing a base product, a constant marginal cost normalized to 1 to produce a unit of a base product and, potentially, a marginal cost δ z to customize a product for a final good producer. An intermediate good firm thus faces the following profit function under outsourcing:
From Figure 2 , it is clear that the customization cost δ z depends on the outsourcing strategy 
By incorporating the intermediate good prices into (10), we are able to determine the final good firm's profit function under the three types of outsourcing:
Industry Equilibrium Determination
In section 4.1 and 4.2, I have solved for the second stage of the model by deriving the profit maximizing price and output under vertical integration and the three types of outsourcing. In this section, I solve the first stage of the model by solving for the equilibrium production structure.
I start off by focusing on the condition under which Customized Outsourcing is preferred to Standardized Outsourcing. This will be the case if a Standardized Outsourcing firm that enters a Customized Outsourcing market makes negative profits. Suppose that it enters the market. In that case, it will face the same equilibrium demand A CO as the other Customized Outsourcing firms, but will have a different profit function (20) . A CO can be derived by inserting (9) and (11) into
By inserting (21) into (20), and imposing negative operating profits, it can be determined that Customized Outsourcing will be chosen over Standardized Outsourcing if:
The condition under which Standardized Outsourcing is preferred to Customized Outsourcing can be derived in a similar fashion. Suppose a Customized Outsourcing firm enters a prevalent Standardized Outsourcing market. In that case, it will face the same equilibrium demand A SO , where:
By inserting (23) into (19) , and imposing negative operating profits, it can be determined that Standardized Outsourcing will be chosen over Customized Outsourcing if:
Equations (22) and (24) 
Customized Outsourcing is the equilibrium production structure if r ≥ 1
Standardized Outsourcing is the equilibrium production structure if r ≤ 1
The inequalities in Theorem Similarly, the impact of an increase in firm-level scale economies F has an ambiguous effect.
Like an increase in σ, it on the one hand increases final good output, thus allowing intermediate good firms to move down their average cost curves faster under Standardized and Customized
Outsourcing. On the other hand, it reduces the number of firms, thus increasing the equilibrium customization costs. An increase in F will induce Standardized or Customized Outsourcing if F , G x and G z are sufficiently high.
Finally, it needs to be noted that intermediate good-level fixed costs G z needs to be sufficiently high for a Standardized or Customized Outsourcing equilibrium to exist. The relative fixed cost G z /G x , however, needs to remain low.
To be complete, we need to determine under which conditions Ideal Outsourcing is a stable equilibrium. Suppose that a group of firms with another production structure attempts to enter a market that has pervasive Ideal Outsourcing. In that case, the final good firm faces the same demand A IO as the other Ideal Outsourcing firms with:
By systematically evaluating the conditions under which firms of no other production configuration are willing to enter an Ideal Outsourcing equilibrium, we can derive Theorem 2:
Theorem 2 Ideal Outsourcing will act as a stable equilibrium if the following two conditions hold: By systematically evaluating the conditions under which firms of no other production configuration are willing to enter a Vertical Integration equilibrium, and comparing them to Theorem 1 and Theorem 2, it is obvious that no two production structures can co-exist except in a knife-edge case. This leads to the following Theorem:
Theorem 3 Generically, no industry has a coexistence of multiple production structures. The model also provides new insights into Stigler's (1951) hypothesis that vertical disintegration should be the typical development in growing industries. In our model, an increase in industry demand induces a rise in the number of final good firms. This, on its part, leads to a decrease in equilibrium customization costs, thus inducing Standardized or Customized Outsourcing.
In summary, the model helps to better appreciate the impact of product modularity on an industry's organization of production in a world in which firms can choose from a multitude of organizational forms. Further research on this topic is needed. As is emphasized by the management literature, the degree of product modularity is not necessarily exogenous as is assumed in this paper, but is up to a certain extent endogenously determined by the management of the firm. Making the degree of product modularity a choice variable can thus provide novel and more complex insights on the role of modularity on the organization of production, and can ultimately lead to a general theory on the optimal degree of product modularity.
